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The Sorrow and the Pity
Dan Rosen
It all started out so beautifully. After decades in which law was marginalized 
and even stigmatized in Japan, the government and industry realized that 
lawyers might actually be a helpful—rather than disruptive—force. With 
grand rhetoric, the Cabinet established the Justice System Reform Council 
in 1999.1 Joining in the fin-de-siècle fervor, the Council was entrusted with the 
responsibility of “clarifying the role to be played by justice in Japanese society 
in the 21st century and examining and deliberating fundamental measures 
necessary for the realization of a justice system that is easy for the people to 
utilize, participation by the people in the justice system, achievement of a legal 
profession as it should be and strengthening the functions thereof, and other 
reforms of the justice system, as well as improvements in the infrastructure of 
that system.”2
This was no mere shoveling away of an issue by assigning it to a committee. 
The Council was directly responsible to the Prime Minister.3 It was made up 
of five professors, three lawyers, and an assortment of representatives from 
other segments of society4 including the secretary-general of Shufuren, the 
Housewives Association. The Council said it set out to ponder the future of 
law in Japan from “the people’s viewpoint.”5
Two years of pondering led to a wide-ranging set of recommendations on 
matters such as access to legal services and internationalization of the legal 
1. Shihō Seido Kaikaku Shingikai Setchihō [Justice System Reform Council Establishment 
Act], Law No. 68 of 1999, art. 2 (Japan).
2. Id. at art. 2, para. 1; Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council: For a Justice System to Support 
Japan in the 21st Century, Justice sys. RefoRm council (June 12, 2001), http://www.kantei.
go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html [hereinafter Recommendations].
3. Kahei Rokumoto, Legal Education, in law in Japan: a tuRning point 190, 216 (Daniel H. 
Foote, ed. 2007).
4. Id.
5. The Points at Issue in the Justice Reform, Justice sys. RefoRm council (Dec. 21, 1999) (Japan), 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/sihou/singikai/991221_e.html [hereinafter Points].
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practice.6 The Council found that the key to accomplishing many of its goals 
was expanding the number of lawyers and enhancing the quality of their 
education.7 This included a call for the creation of law schools, separate and 
distinct from the undergraduate and graduate faculties of law found in many 
universities. More than seventy institutions rose to the challenge, or—we might 
now say—took the bait. 
In 2004, law schools across the country opened amid great expectations. 
It turned out the start of the system was its high point. Gallons of ink have 
already been spilled on this subject in multiple languages. Sweat and tears, 
too. There may even be some blood around. This article is not intended to 
be encyclopedic. My objective is to provide a narrative of what happened by 
someone who was present at the creation, someone who is in the system but 
not of the system. Things look clearer with the benefit of a decade and a half 
of hindsight. This article describes the failure of the government to honor 
its promises, the collusion of the practicing Bar to bring about the breach, 
the re-constricting of legal education, the rapid narrowing in the academic 
background of applicants, the effect on the institutions, and the loss to society. 
The Perspective
Ordinarily, the biography of a journal article author is confined to the 
asterisk at the bottom of the first page. In this case, however, I am writing 
as a participant-observer. Recounting my own story (including more than 
twenty years in Japan) may help the reader in assessing the observations of 
this particular participant. 
I am an American and the product of the American legal education system. 
In law school, I was active in many ancillary activities such as moot court 
and law journal. Approaching the end of my J.D. studies, I found I had an 
appetite for more. I went on to receive LL.M. and J.S.D. degrees and to clerk 
for a federal Court of Appeals judge. Then, I was invited to join the faculty 
of a law school in the state of Louisiana, where—by osmosis—I absorbed some 
knowledge of the civil law system.8 (This would prove to be helpful later in 
understanding the legal system of Japan, another civil law jurisdiction.)
During the bicentennial of the American Constitution, I received a yearlong 
grant to teach American constitutional law in two public universities in Japan. 
I had a fine time and returned to my home institution. However, I had been 
bitten by the overseas bug and found a way to get back to Japan a few years 
later, for a two-and-a-half-year stint at a private university in Kyoto. One of 
6. One longtime observer of the Japanese legal system observed that the reforms held “the 
possibility for revolutionary change.” However, he presciently cautioned that “whether what 
you see is actually what you get is another question.” caRl f. goodman, the Rule of law 
in Japan: a compaRative analysis 5 (2d rev. ed. 2008).
7. See Recommendations, supra note 2.
8. I had taken a course in comparative law in law school, perhaps a foreshadowing of my 
career.
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those years I was conducting research supported by another grant. The other 
year was primarily devoted to teaching, and to my own attempt at learning the 
Japanese language (a work that is still in progress). 
Back to Louisiana for a while. Then came an invitation to become a regular 
member of the faculty at the private university in Kyoto. I moved there in 1997. 
When all the talk about law schools began, I was appointed to the university’s 
Law School Planning Committee. However, in 2004, at the start of the system, 
I moved to the law school of my present employer, a private university in 
Tokyo.
I was not alone. Swept up in the enthusiasm of the Justice System Reform 
Council’s recommendations for internationalization, the school also hired a 
distinguished law professor from Australia. My previous institution brought 
in a German law professor and, eventually, another American. It was a seller’s 
market for law teachers from abroad who wished to work in Japan, as a number 
of institutions were recruiting such scholars for their law schools. 
In addition to serving in my principal position, I have been fortunate to 
teach as an adjunct in several other universities, with responsibilities at the 
law school, graduate school, and undergraduate levels. All of the places I have 
been associated with have worked hard to create fine law schools. All of them 
have offered a good education to their students. And all of them—as well as the 
other law schools in the country (past and present)—have been betrayed by the 
government that set the system into motion.
In the Beginning
Until 2004, legal education in Japan primarily took place in the 
undergraduate law department, known as the Faculty of Law.9 Graduate school 
studies were aimed at students who hoped to become scholars. (Graduate 
schools also served as places where students who did not get job offers to their 
liking could take refuge for a couple of years.) Law was a major, like history or 
physics. Most students who selected it had no intention of becoming lawyers. 
Their goal typically was to work in a company or in a government office. Law 
was considered to be a suitable major for a generalist. 
It’s a good thing so few students expected to work as lawyers. The 
government wouldn’t allow them to. The number of new lawyers was strictly 
9. Prewar legal education, from the Meiji era, is summarized in Setsuo Miyazawa with Hiroshi 
Otsuka, Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan, 1 asian-pac. l. & pol’y J. 1, 3-8 
(2000). The university where I teach was started in this era, in 1885, by a group of eighteen 
lawyers. One of them had studied at Boston University, another at Middle Temple Inn 
of Court in England. They founded the institution under the name Igirisu Hōritsu Gakkō 
(English Law School), in the belief that Japan should adopt the common-law system. They 
lost that argument, but the school—renamed as Chuo University—became one of the leading 
institutions for the training of lawyers. Our History, chuo univ., http://global.chuo-u.ac.jp/
english/aboutus/history/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
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limited.10 Anyone could take the bar exam regardless of college major, but only 
two percent or so would be deemed to have passed. 
Let us pause here to consider the meaning of “passed.” It does not refer to 
some absolute standard of knowledge (e.g., a grade of eighty-five percent). 
Rather, it means the top papers in the stack, up to the number of people the 
government would admit in that year. At the end of the twentieth century, 
Japan had about 21,000 lawyers (bengoshi)11 to serve a population of around 125 
million.12
It was easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a test-
taker to enter the kingdom of lawyers.13 Those who were determined to find 
an opening often paid little attention to courses outside law. Moreover, they 
frequently supplemented their university law courses with lectures at cram 
schools aimed at passing the exam. Many students devoted more energy to 
the cram school, a phenomenon that was common enough to have its own 
word: daigakubanare. After graduation, a substantial number would forgo career 
opportunities to become examination monks, huddled for years in confined 
carrels studying (memorizing?) for the exam, taking it, not being among the 
favored few, spending another year in the carrel, emerging just long enough 
to sit for the exam again, returning to the carrel, and repeating the process for 
years on end.
Even under the best of circumstances, those who passed the bar exam, 
highly intelligent as they were, had a narrow conception of law and not much 
knowledge about anything else. No practical lawyering skills, either, but that 
was to be remedied by two years in the Legal Research and Training Institute, 
a facility under the direction of the Supreme Court.14 All who passed the 
exam were required to study at the Institute. This was law school, at least the 
practical aspects of law school. During their time there, the trainees would 
express a desire to be lawyers, prosecutors, or judges.15 The Institute would 
10. The number was about 500 per year until 1990. After that, it was gradually increased to 
around 1000 at the time the Council began its work in 1999. Points, supra note 5, at III.3(1).
11. Id. Bengoshi are the closest equivalent to American “lawyers,” with all-purpose licenses to 
provide legal services. Japan also has benrishi (patent attorneys), zeirishi (tax attorneys), and 
shihoshoshi (something like legal scriveners and notaries but with the authority to be involved 
in debt consolidation and real estate transactions).
12. Countries with smaller populations had more lawyers: 110,000 in Germany, 83,000 in 
Britain, and 36,000 in France. Points, supra note 5, at III.3(1).
13. See Matthew 19:24 (King James)(“And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go 
through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.”).
14. Saibansho Hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 14 (Japan).
15. The Institute says judges are required to have a “well-rounded education” and professes to 
provide them with organized training to help achieve that goal. However, its conception of 
a well-rounded education is hardly a liberal arts college curriculum. The rest, apparently, is 
up to what the Institute calls “self-cultivation.” The Legal Training and Research Institute of Japan, 
sup. ct. of Japan, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/institute_01/institute/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2016).
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pass judgment and determine who among them would enter the profession. 
(Very few would wash out, but not everyone would get his or her preference.) 
That was the landscape that the Judicial Reform Council set out to rearrange.
A Different Vision
By the end of the twentieth century, Japan had realized something was 
wrong. The economy had been struggling since the burst of the bubble in the 
early 1990s. The country’s primacy in manufacturing and innovation was being 
challenged by other Asian nations: South Korea and China, in particular. 
“Made in Japan” was beginning to sound nostalgic as Apple iPods displaced 
the Sony Walkman on the hips of the hip, Samsung TVs were moving to the 
front of store shelves, and Chinese factories were churning out mass-market 
products at low costs. Japanese salarymen and their corporate employers 
weren’t exactly ready to stage a revolt, but they were groping for ways to turn 
the situation around.
The government, and the Liberal Democratic Party that had controlled 
it for almost all of the postwar period, recognized that the deterioration of 
the economy posed a threat to its grip on power. When corporate interests 
began to agitate for more and better lawyers, the party and the government 
began to take notice.16 Companies had found themselves at a disadvantage in 
international negotiations, especially with American lawyers. Not only were 
they hard pressed to find Japanese attorneys who could go toe-to-toe with the 
Americans, they also had difficulty locating lawyers who know anything about 
the substance of their businesses.17 Lawyers, by and large, had been trained in 
law and nothing else.18
The empanelment of the Justice System Reform Council was seen as part 
of a solution. The Council noted the country was entering the new century 
“carrying with us enormous financial deficits and economic difficulties or a 
sense of some kind of social blockade.”19 It looked to lawyers, and a heightened 
reliance on law, to break through the blockade of political, administrative, and 
social systems that had become sclerotic.
When the Council issued its report in 2001, one of the most direct and 
precise recommendations was “to aim, deliberately and as soon as possible, to 
secure 3,000 new entrants to the legal profession annually” by around 2010.20 
16. See generally Setsuo Miyazawa, Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System Reform in 
Japan, 36 hastings int’l & comp. l. Rev. 313, 314-16 (2013).
17. See Shigenori Matsui, Turbulence Ahead: The Future of Law Schools in Japan, 62 J. legal educ. 3, 9 
(2012).
18. Even Keidanren, the powerful business association, called for the creation of law schools in 
order to produce better-trained lawyers with varied experience. Setsuo Miyazawa, Kay-Wah 
Chan & Ilhyung Lee, The Reform of Legal Education in East Asia, 4 ann. Rev. l. & soc. sci. 333, 
342 (2008).
19. Points, supra note 5, at II.1.
20. Recommendations, supra note 2, at ch. III, pt. 1.1. 
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At that pace, the number of lawyers would reach 50,000 by the year 2018, one 
for every 2400 people in the country.21 
The Council’s vision was a profound departure from the Japanese penchant 
for regulation to prevent “excessive competition.” Throughout the economy, 
entry to business was controlled to prevent failure.22 This applied to everything 
from public baths to broadcast stations. However, change was in the air. By 
the time the Council presented its recommendations, Junichiro Koizumi, a 
reformist Prime Minister (at least so far as any Prime Minister drawn from the 
Liberal Democratic Party could be considered a reformist) had taken office. 
He would even push the heretical policy of privatizing the post office and its 
tentacles of insurance and banking services. If ever the climate was favorable 
for shaking up the legal system, and the comfort of the lawyers protected by a 
dearth of competition, this was it.
The Council said the number of lawyers should be determined by the market 
(based on social demand),23 not the fiat of bureaucrats or the preference of 
existing lawyers for protection. The number 3000, it said, should not be seen 
as an upper limit.24 It envisioned seventy to eighty percent of graduates of the 
new law schools being admitted to practice.25
The Council recognized that the existing system was ill-suited to producing 
sufficient lawyers of the type it believed the country needed. Thus, it proposed 
the creation of postgraduate law schools, not limited to universities. To 
the contrary, the Council envisioned competition between university and 
freestanding law schools leading to a diversity of legal professionals.
It also recognized the limits of the narrow nature of legal education that had 
prevailed to that point. That approach may have worked in the second half of 
the twentieth century, especially in the immediate postwar rebuilding period, 
but it was inadequate for developing lawyers who could effectively operate 
in the more diverse, internationalized twenty-first-century environment. Law, 
by itself, is a set of tools and a way of thinking. It needs other content on 
which to operate. Clients (and countries, for that matter) have issues involving 
employment conditions, technology, family relations, harmful behavior, 
banking, the issuance of stocks and bonds, and many more topics, but nobody 
comes to an attorney with a burning need to resolve a purely abstract question 
of law.
The Council thus recommended recruiting law school applicants from 
the full range of academic areas.26 A lawyer who knows something about 
chemistry could be more helpful to a pharmaceutical producer than one who 
21. Id.
22. See generally RichaRd Katz, Japan: the system that souRed 91 (1998).
23. Recommendations, supra note 2, at ch.III, pt. 1.1.
24. Id.
25. Id. at ch. III, pt. 2, 2(2)d.
26. Id. at ch. III, pt. 2, 2(2)c.
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simply has memorized the rules for submitting an application for approval of 
a medicine. A lawyer with a background in art history would be more effective 
in counseling a sculptor than one who just knows how to read the copyright 
statute. 
Geographic diversity was also a priority. Lawyers, and universities producing 
the lion’s share of lawyers, were concentrated in two urban corridors, centered 
around Tokyo and Osaka. A distribution of law schools across the country 
was expected to provide a ready supply of attorneys for people from Okinawa 
to Hokkaido. A particular embarrassment was what were called “zero-one” 
regions: areas within the jurisdiction of a district court that had only one lawyer, 
or none at all.27 The Council aimed to make citizens aware of what lawyers 
could do for them—to develop a legal consciousness.28 The legal profession, 
it said, “should play the role of the so-called ‘doctors for the people’s social 
lives.’”29
The Council made a couple of recommendations that—apart from the 
subsequent government duplicity—ultimately served to undermine the law 
school system: maintaining the undergraduate law departments and allowing 
law majors to complete law school in two years rather than three.30 These two 
policies, combined, subverted many of the other goals by creating two classes 
of law school citizenship. 
While good reasons were present for dismantling undergraduate law studies, 
the stakeholders in that system strongly resisted. At the time the Council was 
at work, some 45,000 students were enrolled in ninety-three undergraduate law 
departments.31 Not every university could, or would, create a law school, and 
faculty of law professors were, understandably, opposed to defining their jobs 
out of existence. Moreover, employers who had long looked to the faculties of 
law as reliable sources for corporate workers32 were unsettled about how their 
recruiting might be disrupted. 
27. Id. at ch. III, pt. 1.1.
28. Compare taKeyoshi Kawashima, nihonJin no hō ishiKi  (Japanese Legal Consciousness) 
(1967) (Japanese rarely resort to lawyers for cultural reasons) and Takeyoshi Kawashima, 
The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 7 law in Japan: an annual 1 (1974) (translated 
excerpt from the preceding book) with John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. 
Japanese studies 359 (1978) (Japanese rarely resort to litigation in part because of a lack of 
availability of lawyers.) Even after half a century, this debate continues to consume hours 
and hours of scholarly contemplation and pages and pages of publications. See, e.g., taKao 
tanase, community and the law: a cRitical Reassessment of ameRican libeRalism 
and Japanese modeRnity (Luke Nottage & Leon Wolff  trans. and eds., 2010); J. maRK 
RamseyeR & minoRu naKazato, Japanese law: an economic appRoach (1999); Setsuo 
Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima Seriously: A Review of Japanese Legal Consciousness and Disputing Behavior, 
21 law & soc’y Rev. 219 (1987).
29. Recommendations, supra note 2, at ch. I, pt. 2.2.
30. Id. at ch. III, pt. 2.2(2)(c).
31. Id. at ch. III, pt. 2.2(5).
32. The Council referred to this as producing and sending “human resources . . . to various 
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The second policy—of shortening the law school period—was predicated 
on the undergraduate law graduates demonstrating that they had already 
acquired enough basic knowledge to justify skipping basic subjects.33 However, 
this assumed that law school coverage of such subjects would be equivalent 
to the undergraduate version. If that were true, the law schools would have 
failed to provide the kind of advanced, interactive (as opposed to one-way) 
education that the Council charged them with delivering. The Council called 
this “’bi-directional (with give-and-take between teachers and students)” and 
“multidirectional (with interaction among students, as well).”34 So, either the 
Council was not serious about law school education being different from the 
undergraduate model (primarily consisting of lectures) or it was wrong in 
considering the undergraduate study to be equivalent. More likely, it was the 
latter.
That was not the only thing it was wrong about. Part of the benefit of 
recruiting law school students of diverse educational backgrounds was that 
they would learn from one another. Exempting undergraduate law majors 
from basic courses deprived them of the opportunity to learn the material with 
classmates from a wider context. It also sent the message that—despite the 
lofty rhetoric—law was just about law and nothing else.
In fact, the two-year students (kishusha) and three-year students (mishusha) 
rarely meet in the classroom. And the two-year students have next to no time 
to devote to any of the skill-building activities that are staples in American law 
schools, exercises like mock trial, moot court, writing competitions, clinic, and 
law review editing. 
More fundamentally, maintaining undergraduate law studies ensured that 
law schools (and lawyers) would be less educationally diverse. Quite naturally, 
students who major in law are attracted to law school. So, they make up the 
majority of those who enter. Closing off the undergraduate law option would 
have channeled these young minds into other disciplines, upon which they 
could have built their law school studies later.
Korea, which created law schools a few years after Japan, learned from 
Japan’s mistake. It required any institution that opened a law school to close 
its undergraduate law department.35 That does not completely shut off legal 
double dipping. However, since the law schools—for the most part—are in the 
most prestigious institutions (from which most applicants would be expected 
to come), it does have the practical effect of doing so. Companies somehow 
still find college graduates worth employing; society did not crumble.
sectors in society.” Id. 
33. Id. at ch. III, pt. 2.2(2)b-c. 
34. Id. at ch. III, pt. 2.2(2)d.
35. See Dohyun Kim, Recent Reforms in the Legal Profession and Legal Education, in law and society 
in KoRea 150, 161 (Hyunah Yang ed., 2013). See generally Jasper Kim, Socrates v. Confucius: An 
Analysis of South Korea’s Implementation of the American Law School Model, 10 asian-pac. l. & pol’y J. 
322 (2009). 
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In Australia, the University of Melbourne took a bold step in the same 
direction. It was under no compulsion to eliminate undergraduate law 
studies. It decided to do so on its own. As part of an overall assessment of 
its curriculum, the university converted several disciplines—including law 
and medicine—completely to graduate studies. Melbourne could take the 
risk of losing capable students to other institutions because of its status as 
the leader in legal education. Admission was limited to graduate students in 
2008, although undergraduates already enrolled were able to complete their 
programs. The school’s reputation remains strong, and at least one study 
found that the J.D. students are more satisfied than their LL.B. predecessors.36
Like all political policies, the Japanese legal reform recommendations 
were the result of bartering. Not all the ingredients were excellent, but—
by and large—they had the makings of something that could be nutritious. 
The Cabinet signed off on the plan in March of 2002,37 and the Diet passed 
enabling legislation that same year.38
The plan may have called for more competition, but that is not the same as 
deregulation. To the contrary, the government deeply involved itself in setting 
standards for the law schools and admission to practice. The Education 
Ministry rules schools. The Supreme Court controls the practice. The Justice 
Ministry runs the bar exam. Each of these entities has different constituents 
and listens to different people. The plan did not unify their perspectives; it just 
pushed resolution of the disagreements further into the future, much as Henry 
Clay’s “Great Compromise” ultimately led to the Civil War.
One might well ask what the Education Ministry would know about 
training lawyers. In the United States, lawyers (through the American Bar 
Association) and law professors (through the Association of American Law 
Schools) set the standards for law schools and essentially regulate them 
through the accreditation process. The U.S. is not always a paragon of virtue, 
but—at least on this point—its approach makes sense: standard-setting by 
people who understand the content.39
The Education Ministry of Japan may have many talented administrators (I 
refrain from using the word “bureaucrats” because of its negative connotation). 
However, the content and practice of law give rise to different considerations 
than general educational issues. The Ministry convened a Law School 
36. Wendy Larcombe, Letty Tumbaga, Ian Malkin, Pip Nicholson & Orania Tokatlidis, Does 
an Improved Experience of Law School Protect Students against Depression, Anxiety and Stress? An Empirical 
Study of Wellbeing and the Law School Experience of LLB and JD Students, 35 sydney l. Rev. 407, 421 
(2013).
37. Judicial Reform Promotion Plan, nihon no naiKaKu (Mar. 19, 2002) (Japan), http://www.kantei.
go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/keikaku/020319keikaku.html.
38. Hōka Daigakuin no Kyōiku to Shihō Shiken tō to no Renkai tō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Act 
on Linkage Between Law School Education and Bar Examination], Law No. 139 of 2002 
(Japan).
39. See Gerald Paul McAlinn, Reforming the System of Legal Education: A Call for Bold Leadership and 
Self–Governance, 2 asian-pac. l. & pol’y J. 15 (2001).
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Committee, including law professors, others from the legal profession, and 
people from other sectors of society.40 Political forces also became involved, 
and the Education Ministry had to coordinate its efforts with those of the 
Cabinet’s Office for the Preparation of the Promotion of Justice System 
Reform.41 The resulting standards42 reached every crevice of legal education: 
from who was qualified to teach (e.g., how many articles in recent years) to 
how many students could be in the classrooms.43 They were notably precise 
and confining for a project that was supposed to be encouraging an expansive 
approach to legal education. 
Most law professors didn’t know much about running a law school, since 
Japan did not have any until 2004. They had come up through the graduate 
schools, which grant master’s and Ph.D. degrees and primarily are devoted to 
training scholars, not lawyers. Some who had studied in law schools in other 
countries played leading roles in envisioning what Japanese law schools might 
look like.44 They had to convince their colleagues and the government of the 
value of converting to a new system. Faculty of law academics, in particular, 
were skeptical about abandoning the undergraduate/graduate school model. 
People who hoped to become lawyers but had not yet passed the exam were 
opposed to impeding their opportunity to take the test repeatedly. And then, 
there were the lawyers. A substantial minority opposed increasing the size of 
the practicing bar and, not coincidentally, competition.
One salutary effect of the debate was that it set off what was perhaps 
Japan’s first extensive contemplation of what legal education should be. For 
several years, barely a week went by without some organization or institution 
convening a symposium on law school curriculum, methods, and goals. 
Nothing existed in Japan like the MacCrate Report,45 which had set the 
agenda for American legal education from the 1990s. Indeed, the federation of 
40. See Miyazawa, supra note 16, at 328-29.
41. Id. at 331-34.
42. Id. at 334. 
43. See Matsui, supra note 17, at 10.
44. Professor Daniel Foote, an American on the faculty of the University of Tokyo, is someone 
who brought law school expertise to the process. From 2001 to 2005 he worked with the 
Education Ministry on law school matters and from 2002 to 2004 with the Headquarters for 
the Promotion of Justice System Reform. 
45. a.b.a. section of legal educ. & admissions to the baR, legal education and 
pRofessional development—an educational continuum (1992) (the “MacCrate 
Report” named for Robert MacCrate, Esq., chairman of the task force). See also a.b.a. 
section of legal educ. & admissions to the baR, Twenty Years After the MacCrate Report: 
A Review of the Current State of Legal Education Continuum and the Challenges Facing the Academy, Bar, 
and Judiciary (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/
june2013councilmeeting/2013_open_session_e_report_prof_educ_continuum_
committee.authcheckdam.pdf..
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bar associations commissioned two scholars, Setsuo Miyazawa and Eri Osaka, 
to translate it into Japanese.46 
Grumbling could be heard from a number of directions about the prospect 
of an Americanization of legal education and, ultimately, the profession. Part 
of this was based on the belief that even if the American approach suited 
American law and society, it would be out of place in the civil law context 
of Japan. This debate was a distant echo of the nineteenth-century Meiji-era 
choice of a legal system for a modernizing Japan. The civil law prevailed then. 
Why then should Japan choose an American common-law-based system for its 
legal training now?
Several reasons presented themselves. One was that, as a practical matter, 
American-style law practice and lawyers had become the default for global 
legal practice in the twenty-first century. American lawyers and law firms 
were everywhere. Their standards, to a great extent, had become the global 
standard. If Japanese lawyers were to hold their own in this environment, for 
the benefit of their clients, they needed to know how to operate.
Also, the United States had a longer history of legal education reforms. 
With a million lawyers and 200 or so law schools, it had amassed a formidable 
amount of experience in what worked and what did not.47 The MacCrate 
Report, for example, identified a need for skills training and pointed law 
schools in that direction. By the 2000s, schools recognized an excessive 
inward-looking tendency, leading to widespread experimentation and 
implementation of various approaches to globalization of the curricula.48 The 
Council’s recommendations did not refer to the United States, but they were 
replete with concepts that had come from that country.49
Opening Day and the Subsequent Seasons
Japan has largely accepted the western calendar. In practice, however, the 
new year begins with the flowering of the cherry trees. New employees report 
to work in April, companies turn the page on their budgets, and schools open 
their doors for the spring semester—the start of the academic year.
So it was in 2004. Sixty-eight law schools welcomed their first classes 
and got down to the business of transforming the Japanese legal system.50 
Optimism was blossoming all around. Students had arrived with a diversity 
of backgrounds. In that year and the next few, I had several students who 
46. See Miyazawa et al., supra note 18, at 344. 
47. See generally Dan Rosen, Schooling Lawyers, 2 asian-pac. l. & pol’y J. 66 (2001).
48. For example, the theme of the 2013 annual meeting of the Association of American 
Law Schools was “Global Engagement and the Legal Academy,” 2013 Annual 
Meeting Program, AALS, https://memberaccess.aals.org/eweb/DynamicPage.
aspx?webcode=2013amwhy&Reg_evt_key=a931e6c6-e043-4c5d-9af6-491599393238&RegPat
h=EventRegFees.
49. See Miyazawa et al., supra note 18, at 346.
50. Six more started the next year, for a total of 74. Id.
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had given up careers in the Foreign Ministry to come to law school. They 
were mostly in their early 30s and had already had overseas postings.  Another 
member of the entering class was pushing 60. He had just retired from one of 
the country’s major newspapers. 
Classes such as mine, focusing on international law and the law of other 
countries, attracted sizable enrollments at many schools. My Australian 
colleague taught Asian business transactions. He arranged a two-week study-
abroad program at the University of Melbourne. Close to twenty students 
signed up. Elective courses flourished in topics that never would appear on the 
bar exam. Students accepted the invitation to expand their horizons, trusting 
in the promise that seventy percent to eighty percent of them would pass that 
hurdle. After all, the Reform Council had said that legal training would no 
longer be focused “only on the ‘single point’ of the national bar examination 
but by organically connecting legal education, the national bar examination, 
and apprenticeship training as a ‘process’ . . . .”51 Indeed, at the most selective 
schools, the pass rate was expected to be well above the national average. And 
so, students at those institutions could look at the bar exam much as their 
American counterparts do at top and even mid-level institutions: just another 
step in the march to becoming lawyers, not a nearly impenetrable barrier.
The schools themselves were diverse too. The large number meant that 
essentially every region had a school that could train people who would stay 
nearby and provide legal services. Okinawa’s University of the Ryukyus had 
an entering class of thirty; big schools in Tokyo—such as Chuo, Waseda, and 
Tokyo—took in 300. One of the three Tokyo bar associations even helped 
start a freestanding law school in nearby Saitama prefecture. Its mission was 
to approach legal education with a fresh perspective and provide training 
informed by the profession. 
So for two or three years, it looked as though the law schools had checked all 
the boxes in the Reform Council’s recommendations. Teachers were thinking 
deeply about how best to present the material; students were willing to take 
at least some courses outside the “mainstream.” Spirits were running high. 
 
Signs of trouble, however, were emerging.
Do the math. The Council had projected a bar exam pass rate of seventy 
percent to eighty percent, aiming toward 3000 new lawyers per year. The 
Education Ministry had authorized approximately 5800 students per year for 
the various law schools. The Justice Ministry’s Bar Exam Committee, however, 
was dragging its feet. The pass rate for the first exam (2006) to include law 
school graduates (from the two-year program) was forty-eight percent. The 
next year, with both two-year and three-year graduates taking the exam, the 
rate declined to forty percent.52
51. Recommendations, supra note 2, at ch. III, pt. 2.1.
52. Miyazawa et al., supra note 18, at 348.
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By 2007, the new Justice Minister, Kunio Hatoyama, publicly joined the 
counterrevolution. He said 3000 lawyers a year was too many for a country 
that favors negotiation and conciliation. Japan, he said, should not become 
a litigious society.53 The next year brought a new chairman of the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations (Nichibenren) to office. Makoto Miyazaki and 
the Federation both called for rolling back the 3000-a-year plan, or at least 
postponing it.54 The attack on the reforms was a turnabout for Nichibenren. It 
had passed a resolution supporting the Reform Council’s vision in 2001.55 
The resolution garnered a two-thirds majority of the lawyers voting.56 The 
opponents may have been in the minority, but they were second to none in 
intensity. They did not simply accept the loss and walk away.57
Miyazaki contended that increasing the number of lawyers was adversely 
affecting quality.58 That is one of the primary arguments of opponents. Some 
actually believe it. They, quite naturally, think that the system that produced 
them must be right. That conclusion assumes that the previous number is 
imbued with some Archimedean perfection for discerning the legal talent 
present within the population. Five hundred per year was the standard for a 
long time. A thousand per year was the norm just before the law school system 
started. Fifteen hundred were allowed to pass in the early years of the law 
school system. The Bar, in 2015, opined that 1500 was appropriate.59 
In any case, this assumption reflects a profound lack of confidence in the 
intellectual capacity of the country’s youth. In 2010, Noboru Kashiwagi, a 
distinguished law school professor and former legal officer for a global 
corporation, observed, “[S]trangely enough, no serious discussion or empirical 
research has been conducted regarding the level of skills and knowledge 
required for qualification as a contemporary lawyer. It seems that the standard 
set more than 50 years ago, when most lawyers were litigators, has been 
53. Setsuko Kamiya, Scales of Justice: Legal System Looks for Right Balance of Lawyers, the Japan times, 
Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/03/18/reference/scales-of-justice-
legal-system-looks-for-right-balance-of-lawyers/#.WFDkFnd7F8c.
54. Bar Groups Hit Haste to Hike Lawyer Ranks, the Japan times, July 19, 2008, http://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/07/19/national/bar-groups-hit-haste-to-hike-lawyer-ranks/#.
V7K5F2XUk0Q.
55. See Daniel H. Foote, The Trials and Tribulations of Japan’s Legal Education Reforms, 36 hastings 
int’l & comp. l. Rev. 369, 373-74 (2013).
56. Id. at 374.
57. In the 1990s, the Bar had also opposed proposals to increase the number of exam-passers 
from 500 to 1000, although it eventually gave in. Id. at 388.
58. See Hideki Kojima, Current Topics Surrounding the Legal Environment in Japan,  IPBA J., Dec. 2008, 
at 7, 9, https://ipba.org/media/normal/1602_2008_-_Dec.pdf.
59. Susumu Murakoshi, Statement Concerning “Further Promotion of Systematic Reform in the Fostering of 
Legal Professionals” (Summary), Japan fedeRation of baR assoc., June 30, 2015, http://www.
nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2015/150630.html.
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retained, without regard to Japan’s current requirements.”60 The strangeness 
continues, with supposition substituting for illumination.
The declining quality argument is also sometimes linked to a shared aversion 
to competition. Even if the new lawyers are competent, their swelling ranks, 
it is said, will lead to price-cutting. And price-cutting will result in cutting 
corners on services. Similar arguments have been made in the United States, 
with—for example—restrictions on advertising by pharmacies61 and lawyers.62 
The conclusion has been that the profession can and should continue to 
monitor the actual quality of the services rather than deprive consumers of the 
benefits of competition.
If, for the sake of argument, we grant the dubious proposition that the top 
1000 scorers on the bar exam will be better lawyers than the next 2000, we still 
must wonder: Is Japanese society really served by limiting the practice to the 
very best and brightest? Not everyone needs the most excellent (and expensive) 
attorney, just as not everyone needs the most excellent medical specialist. A 
head cold does not require the services of a brain surgeon. However, it can 
benefit from the attention of a competent physician of some sort.
Insisting on excellence rather than competence (in this case, as narrowly 
defined by exam scores) results in a lack of access to competence. The Bar’s 
argument—couched in terms of protecting the public—in fact results in people 
going forth with no legal advice at all or paying for a lot more expertise than 
they need.
Lawyers also profess concern about the ability of new lawyers to make a 
living. The jobs just aren’t there, they say. Indeed, one of the disappointments 
of lawyers educated in the law schools has been fewer law firm openings than 
they had hoped for in the big cities. This is not necessarily bad, if it pushes 
them to less populated areas. That was one of the Reform Council’s goals. 
Additionally, corporations, associations, and government agencies are coming 
around to the idea of hiring in-house legal specialists. Such attorneys, with the 
benefit of a law school education, are surely better-prepared to be helpful than 
the undergraduate law majors who used to fill most such positions. Not every 
bengoshi needs to be operating within the framework of a law office.63 This also 
fits well with the Council’s goal of expanding the variety of legal services.
A cynic may suspect that the public-spirited arguments against increasing 
the ranks of lawyers are really a cover for protectionism. I cringed, a few years 
ago, when I heard a Japanese lawyer making a presentation to a group of 
visiting American attorneys. He said that his father (also a lawyer) had taken 
60. Noboru Kashiwagi, Creation of Japanese Law Schools and Their Current Development, in legal 
education in asia: globalization, change and contexts 185, 196 (Stacey Steele & 
Kathryn Taylor, eds. 2010).
61. Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
62. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
63. See generally Masahiro Tanaka, Japanese Law Schools in Crisis: A Study on the Employability of Law School 
Graduates, 3 asian J. legal educ. 38 (2016).
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the family on a vacation to the U.S. when the speaker was a child. Now the 
speaker himself was a lawyer, but—he complained—he could not afford to do 
the same for his wife and children. Thus, he concluded, Japan should not have 
any more lawyers.
Was this a joke? It didn’t seem so. Rather, it appeared to be offered more as 
a case study: the family vacation as a benchmark for determining the proper 
population of lawyers. Somehow, the Reform Council had failed to consider 
this in its deliberations on promoting rule of law and access to legal services. 
Medical doctors voiced protectionist sentiments in the 1980s, causing the 
country to hold the line on new physicians, halt plans for new medical schools, 
and cut back authorized enrollments in existing medical schools until 2008. 
Mission accomplished: The number of physicians per capita became two-
thirds the average of industrialized nations, with even worse sparseness in rural 
areas.64 Physicians’ income was preserved, at the cost of public health.  Since 
then, the need for more, rather than fewer, physicians has become apparent, 
and the number of medical doctors increased 9.3% between 2006 and 2012.65 
Another argument proffered for controlling the number of exam-passers is 
the limited capacity of the Legal Training and Research Institute, where skills 
training does take place. The question, however, should be why the Institute 
continues to exist. It was created at a time before law schools.66 Undergraduate 
schools could not be expected to teach lawyering skills to teenagers. Doctrine 
was their domain. Students who demonstrated command of the doctrine by 
passing the bar exam then moved on to the Institute, where they would be 
trained in how to use it.
But now we have law schools, obviating the Institute’s raison d’être. By 
maintaining a full three-year program, the law schools could—and should—
assume responsibility for skills training, perhaps in concert with a period of 
apprenticeship.67 The current year-and-a-half Training Institute duty already 
includes a year of such apprenticeships. All that would have to be done is 
64. Editorial, Dubious Cure for Doctor Shortage, the Japan times, Jan. 3, 2014, http://www.
japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/01/03/editorials/dubious-cure-for-doctor-shortage/#.
V7LAmWXUn3A.
65. Japan has about 300,000 physicians, close to ten times the number of lawyers. See Masatoshi 
Matsumoto, Soichi Koike, Saori Kashima & Kazuo Awai, Geographic Distribution of Radiologists 
and Utilization of Teleradiology in Japan: A Longitudinal Analysis Based on National Census Data, 
plos/one, Sept. 30, 2015, http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.
pone.0139723 (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
66. Setsuo Miyazawa, who was deeply involved in discussions about the law school system, 
recommended abolishing the Institute and entrusting the Bar with the responsibility of 
providing practical training. Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of 
Law at Last?, 2 asian-pac. l. & pol’y J. 89, 112 (2001).
67. Prof. Hisaei Ito has proposed one year of practical training in an Inns of Court-type 
environment instead of conventional law schools, followed by two years of practical training 
at a law firm. Hisaei Ito, “Falling Law School” in the US and Japan, the Japan news, http://www.
yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/dy/education/20140807.html.
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abolish the Institute’s own six months of instruction, at least for those who 
do not intend to be judges or prosecutors. The Institute, as one might expect, 
is not enthusiastic about the prospect of extinction. It is more than a school; 
it is an instrument of uniformity and acculturation to its particular view of a 
proper legal society. 
Every lawyer, every prosecutor, and every judge in Japan has been to the 
same “law school”: the Institute. Critics assert that its faculty tries to imbue 
the students with an orthodoxy that perpetuates the status quo. They suspect 
that approach also lays the groundwork for “the extreme form of legal 
positivism and passivity of most judges in Japan.”68 Judges are loath to hold 
statutes unconstitutional; criminal defendants are almost always convicted; 
tort plaintiffs are awarded minuscule damages. Legal professionals become 
acculturated to the values behind those truths formally and informally during 
their training days.69
While I disagree with the protectionist opposition of lawyers, at least I 
understand where they’re coming from. But why would the country go to all 
the trouble of studying its legal profession, concluding that it needed lawyers 
who were more deeply and broadly educated, creating a law school system for 
accomplishing that, and then allow would-be lawyers to opt out of law school 
and go straight to an exam? 
That is, in fact, what the powers-that-be decreed once the “new”70 bar exam 
was put in place in 2011.71 People who fancied a lawyer’s career could avoid 
the inconvenience of obtaining a legal education by passing the yobi shiken 
preliminary qualifying exam. They would then proceed to the bar exam. 
Like the bar exam itself, the preliminary exam emphasizes the roppo, the six 
fundamental subjects:72 constitutional law, civil code, civil procedure, criminal 
law, criminal procedure, and commercial law.73 Nothing about the test rewards 
the breadth of inquiry envisioned by the Reform Council.  
68. Miyazawa, supra note 66, at 112.
69. On the other hand, lawyers and their organizations have been among the more progressive 
elements of Japanese society. They are among the few institutional groups to challenge the 
government and, at least sometimes, to champion unpopular positions.
70. Although not all that new in scope. See Stacey Steele & Anesti Petridis, Japanese Legal Education 
Reform: A Lost Opportunity to End the Cult(ure) of the National Bar Examination and Internationalise 
Curricula?, in the inteRnationalisation of legal education: the futuRe pRactice of 
law 92 (William van Caenegem & Mary Hiscock eds., 2014).
71. See Stacy Steele, Japan’s National Bar Examination: Results from 2015 and Impact of the Preliminary 
Qualifying Examination, 41 J. Japanese l. 56, 57-58 (2016).
72. Japanese law students carry a copy of the roppo around with them from the day they enter law 
school to the day they finish.
73. The bar exam magnanimously offers the choice of one elective: insolvency, tax, economic 
law, intellectual property, employment law, environmental law, public international law, or 
private international law. See Steele, supra note 71, at 57-58.
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Applicants get the message: All the posturing about diversity of training 
is not to be believed. What counts is what has always counted: the basics, 
brutally memorized and available for instant recall. So, they either lock 
themselves away to push provisions of the codes into their cerebra or they sign 
up for cram schools that will force-feed them what they need to pass the test. 
Many of the preliminary exam-takers are also law school students, operating 
in cram-school mode. They sit in law school classes but devote their attention 
to preliminary exam preparation.74 And if they pass that exam, they frequently 
wave sayonara to their law schools.75 It’s essentially the pre-law school system 
state of affairs, resurrected.
What’s more, it works. The highest passage rate on the 2016 bar exam came 
not from alumni of any of the law schools but rather from exam-takers who 
had started with the yobi shiken. Close to sixty-two percent of them passed. The 
law school with the best rate, Hitotsubashi, had slightly less than fifty percent. 
The mighty University of Tokyo was barely over forty-eight percent.76 Not 
surprisingly, applications to law schools have been falling. (This surely is also 
related to the draconian overall pass rate on the bar exam, just under 23 percent 
in 2016.)77 Those opting for the preliminary exam have been increasing. 
So, why would the government subvert the very law school system it 
created? One answer is that the government is not monolithic. As mentioned 
earlier, the Education and Justice ministries both have their hands in the 
setup, as does the Supreme Court. Politicians too. The argument is made that 
excluding people who cannot afford law school tuition from the possibility 
of practicing law is unfair. I am not at all unsympathetic to the proposition, 
advanced most prominently in the U.S. by Bernie Sanders, that higher 
education should be free. However, even Bernie would not advocate foisting 
uneducated “professionals” on the public. If affordability is all the government 
is concerned about, it could provide more scholarships and loans. And, by the 
way, cram schools are not free, either.78
74. Ironically, the Education Ministry rejected the applications of universities that had planned 
to partner with cram schools to create law schools at the start of the law school system. 
See Eriko Arita, 66 Institutions Win Approval to Open U.S.–Style Law Schools, the Japan times, 
Nov. 22, 2003, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2003/11/22/national/66-institutions-win-
approval-to-open-u-s-style-law-schools/#.V8gckGXUk0Q.
75. One might wonder if students who bypassed law school or who bailed out before graduating 
would be viewed as less desirable candidates for employment. Steele reports that, to the 
contrary, some lawyers say bar exam passers who started with the preliminary exam are in 
high demand. Steele, supra note 71, at 65. One reason may be that their experience resembles 
that of most of the lawyers doing the hiring, who entered the profession before the advent of 
law schools.
76. See Steele, supra note 71, at 60 (previous year’s results).
77. 6899 sat for the exam, and 1583 were allowed to pass. The Justice Ministry posted the raw 
numbers, school by school, at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001202510.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2016).
78. A two-year program can cost about $12,000, roughly equivalent to two years of law school 
tuition at a public university. The introduction of the law school system has been good 
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Whatever one thinks of Brian Tamanaha’s assertion that attending an 
American law school may not be worth the cost,79 the numbers are dramatically 
different in Japan. Tamanaha cites statistics that in 2011, the average private 
law school tuition in the U.S. was $39,184.80 In Japan, in 2016, tuition at even 
the best private law schools is around $15,000 per year. Public law schools, 
including the highly prestigious University of Tokyo, are less than $10,000. 
These are not backbreaking, mortgage-equivalent numbers. Moreover, many 
of the students—those who majored in law as undergraduates—are only there 
for two years. 
Implicit in the backdoor approach are a number of troubling beliefs:
1) Law school really doesn’t enhance the quality of a lawyer.
2) The bar exam is what actually measures suitability to be a lawyer.
3) The Reform Council’s findings are just rhetoric.
Those beliefs may not be true, but the system operates as if they are. The 
result is self-contradictory. On one hand, the regulators have loaded the 
curricula of law schools with required courses.81 On the other hand, they have 
excused applicants for the preliminary exam from taking any courses. It’s not 
unlike the battles between taxi drivers and Uber drivers being waged in cities 
around the world. The former are highly regulated; the latter do as they like. 
They both pick up passengers.
All those required courses leave little room for the kind of skill-training 
experiences that American law schools embraced decades ago. That’s 
especially so for students in the two-year program. Of course, those who go 
it alone or opt for cram school get none at all. Moot court? Anyone who has 
been through law school in the United States knows how time-intensive that 
can be, and how effective it is in integrating the skills of research, writing, 
and argumentation. The closest thing in Japan is a negotiation-and-arbitration 
contest held every December, open to schools around the country (and 
for cram schools’ business. At first, they worried that law school education would displace 
them. In fact, it multiplied their opportunities. They now offer courses for taking law school 
entrance exams, courses for students taking the preparatory qualifying exam, and courses 
for everybody taking the bar exam.
79. bRian z. tamanaha, failing law schools (2012).
80. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Is Law School Worth the Cost?, 63 J. legal educ. 173, 174 (2013).
81. Professor Foote raised the concern that all the required courses left little room for courses in 
other fields, clinics, and other innovations that the Reform Council anticipated. He was told 
that if standards of that sort were not put in place, schools would be likely to impose even 
more bar exam-related required courses. Foote, supra note 55, at 400.
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abroad, for that matter).82 Law schools are hard pressed to field teams; most 
participants come from undergraduate and graduate schools.
Law review? The three-year model of American law schools may not 
be perfect,83 but it is well-suited to the training that law reviews provide: 
qualification in the first year, apprenticeship in the second (including writing 
projects of increasing sophistication), and editorship (including interaction 
with professional authors) in the third. Japanese students would be quite 
comfortable with that model, as it is essentially what they have experienced 
in school club (bukatsu) activities: Older students (sempai) show younger 
ones (kohai) the ropes, with Confucian-style responsibilities running in both 
directions. 
The two-year (or no-year) programs complicate any attempt to adopt the 
American student-run law journal system in Japan. Students at Waseda Law 
School created a journal called Law & Practice, more or less like a U.S. law 
journal. That is the only one I know of. They are heroes. Chuo Law School 
has a small group of students involved in checking citations and content for 
its law journal. Editorial control, however, is with the faculty. Japan has next 
to no tradition of student-edited journals. In any case, academic writing is 
generally seen as an endeavor for graduate school students, not professional 
school students. 
The same is true for clinics. If the scope of student activity in legal writing 
and editing is restricted, one can imagine the constraints involved in working 
with “live clients.” Some law schools do have clinics and do fine work within 
the confines imposed upon them.84 However, through no fault of their own, 
they cannot give students or clients the depth that is provided by many clinics 
in American and other countries’ law schools. Even if the law allowed them to, 
students’ schedules would not.
Study abroad would seem to be one of the most important activities of 
the new law schools, in keeping with the Reform Council’s conclusion that 
Japan needs lawyers who are able to operate in a globalized environment. 
More than 200 such programs are offered by American law schools, in almost 
every part of the world from Accra to Zagreb.85 Japanese law schools have only 
82. See Outline, inteRcollegiate negotiation competition (INC), http://www.negocom.jp/
eng/what/ (last visited, Oct. 21, 2016).
83. But see Elizabeth Olson, The 2-Year Law Education Fails to Take Off, n.y. times, Dec. 25, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/26/business/dealbook/the-2-year-law-education-fails-to-
take-off.html?_r=0.
84. See Matthew J. Wilson, Legal Clinical Education in Japan: A Work in Progress, in clinical legal 
education in asia 195, 200 (Shuvro Prosun Sarker ed., 2015); Shigeo Miyagawa, Takao 
Suami, Peter A. Joy & Charles D. Weisselberg, Japan’s New Clinical Programs: A Study of Light and 
Shadow, in the global clinical movement: educating lawyeRs foR social Justice 105, 
106 (Frank S. Bloch ed., 2011).
85. a.b.a. section of legal educ. & admissions to the baR, Foreign Summer and Intersession 
Programs, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/foreign_study/
foreign_summer_winter_programs.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
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a handful. Chuo Law School used to have four: Melbourne, Hong Kong, 
Hawaii, and Vietnam. It now offers only the first two. The programs run one 
or two weeks. Waseda Law School allows a half-dozen or so students to spend 
a year at overseas law schools, typically leading to an LL.M. degree. A few 
more schools also offer study-abroad opportunities, but not many. Time is one 
issue. Students in the two-year program have only one chance to participate.86 
Even three-year students, considering joining after their first year, worry that a 
week or two overseas might adversely affect their preparation for the bar exam, 
coming two years in the future! This angst has increased over the years, as the 
pass rate on the bar exam has fallen.
The reticence to attend study-abroad programs is part of a wider pattern. 
Many law schools have developed curricula rich with electives. The draconian 
pass rate on the bar exam, however, is the strongest possible disincentive to 
enrollment. No matter how much the government may say about the need 
for broadly trained lawyers, by maintaining a chokehold on entrance to the 
profession, it channels students to bar-related subjects and away from others 
that may divert attention from what is seen as the principal task at hand. 
I teach a course, for example, in international entertainment law. It provides 
an opportunity to examine a wide range of legal subjects—contracts, torts, 
intellectual property, business associations, conflicts of law, and more—in 
action. Japan’s entertainment industry is one of the largest in the world. The 
country is both a major importer and exporter.87 Knowing about this could 
be extremely helpful to a young lawyer developing a career. Even those who 
don’t envision having such clients can benefit from integrating the strands of 
law they have studied to that point and seeing how law operates in a global 
context. 88
The course materials—including pleadings, court decisions, and statutes—are 
mostly, but not exclusively, in English. The subject is inherently entertaining. 
Many students are interested, but few enroll. The diversion of time from 
studying bar exam subjects is seen as outweighing the attraction. I get it, and 
86. In fact, they could participate after their second and final year too, but as the bar exam 
comes just a few months after that, none would.
87. The government has even made promotion of Japanese entertainment internationally a 
priority, with money and an unfortunately named “Cool Japan” initiative. Kabushigaisha 
Kaigai Juyō Kaitaku Shien Kikō Hō [Act on the Establishment of the Japan Brand Fund], 
Law No. 51 of 2013. See, e.g., Cool Japan Strategy Promotion Council, Cool Japan Strategy Public-
Private Collaboration Initiative, cabinet office, gov’t of Japan, http://www.kantei.go.jp/
jp/singi/titeki2/cool_japan/pdf/20150617_initiative_honbun_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 
21, 2016); What is Cool Japan Fund?, cool Japan fund, inc., https://www.cj-fund.co.jp/en/
about/cjfund.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2016); Cool Japan/Creative Industries Policy, ministRy 
of economy, tRade and industRy, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/mono_info_
service/creative_industries/creative_industries.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
88. See Dan Rosen, A New Stage for Legal Education: Entertainment Law as a Model for Client-Based Teaching, 
1 chuo l.J. 143 (2004) (written amid great optimism for what was then the new law school 
system).
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am all the more grateful for those students who are willing to take a leap of 
faith and sign up. 
The same is true for my course in American law. No country is more 
important to Japan’s international trade than the United States. The course 
covers areas of American law that Japanese clients are mostly likely to 
encounter and alerts students to major differences in the two systems89 (e.g., 
consideration in contracts). It is directly relevant to matters that students may 
confront in their practice. When the law school system started, the class was 
well-subscribed. As the reality of bar exam pass rates sank in, the numbers 
dropped. I am not the only teacher of such a course in Japan, and I am not the 
only one to be facing more empty seats in the classroom.
This is not just the lament of a teacher from overseas. Professor Kashiwagi 
observed, “Law schools offer a variety of other courses and subjects, including 
law and sociology, law and economics, consumer law, law of the aged, juvenile 
law, common law, Chinese law, French law, German law, Roman law, legal 
writing, legal negotiation, legal ethics, interviewing and counseling. However, 
most students are unwilling to study subjects other than those that are 
included on the Bar Examination . . . . [They] simply do not have the luxury 
of spending time on these other subjects.”90 That was the case in 2010 when his 
words were published. It is even more so today. 
Forward to the Past
And so, after nearly two decades of study and more than twelve years of 
operation of law schools, Japanese legal education is racing toward the past. 
The wave of talented people willing to be part of the great reform movement 
has turned into a trickle. Nearly 73,000 applied for law school admission in 
the first year. That is now down to fewer than 10,000. As noted earlier, the 
number admitted to practice is being pushed back too. And the academic 
background of new lawyers has—for the most part—resisted diversity. Law 
school applicants, and bar exam passers, are primarily people who majored 
in law in college.
The government, which sets the number allowed to pass the bar exam 
before anyone picks up a pencil, has begun pressuring schools that have low 
pass rates. “Excess competition; low quality” goes the refrain, even though 
the performance of the students—in an objective sense—might be quite good. 
Universities in Japan, both public and private, receive funding from the 
government. Funding for “low-performing” schools91 has been cut. Some 
89. See generally Dan Rosen, Butaman for Breakfast and Other Morsels of Legal Reasoning, in legal 
education in asia: globalization, change and contexts, supra note 60, at 200.
90. Kashiwagi, supra note 60, at 192.
91. Based on bar exam pass rates, entrance exam statistics, and reaching or falling short of 
authorized enrollment. See Editorial, Law School and Bar Exam Reform, the Japan times, Oct. 
3, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/10/03/editorials/law-school-and-bar-
exam-reform/#.V7VqVGXUk0Q.
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have given up; the number of law schools has fallen to about fifty. And not 
surprisingly, those that are doing well are, by and large, those that were on top 
in the old system: big-name institutions in large cities. 
Lawyers who come through the law school system certainly enter the 
profession with more, and better, training than their predecessors. Faculty 
members are working hard to teach well.92 However, the improvement in the 
training of lawyers is far less profound than what was envisioned. Beyond that, 
as we have seen, many students spend an abbreviated time in law school, and 
some would-be lawyers don’t even bother. The overall number of attorneys 
has increased, and zero-one regions have gotten a few of them. But these 
improvements are marginal.
This story has no shortage of victims, students and educational institutions 
among them. The greatest loser of all, though, is the public, which has been 
deprived of the many benefits envisioned by the Reform Council. It was 
promised a tale of reform and progress. Instead it got a story of relapse and 
regression.93
92. See Kashiwagi, supra note 60, at 190-91.
93. Writing in a magazine for lawyers, Professor Kashiwagi recently compared Japan’s legal 
education with its medical education and with legal education in Korea. He concluded that 
Japanese legal education suffers from a lack of clarity on desirable outcomes and that the 
country needs to decide what kind of legal society it wants. Noboru Kashiwagi, Nihon no Ishi 
Yōsei Kyōiku to Hōsō Yōsei Kyōiku oyobi Kankoku no Hōsō Yōsei (Japan’s Medical Education Training 
and its Legal Education Training as Well as South Korea’s Legal Education Training), nbl 
(new business law), no. 1081 (2016) at 22, 28.
